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Introduction
Crowdfunding has, in recent years, attracted much attention as a new mode of entrepreneurial financing: through the internet many individuals -the crowd -provide funds directly to the entrepreneur. 1 In the narrower context of reward crowdfunding, this crowd consists of the very consumers whom the entrepreneur intends to target with her product.
Hence, crowdfunding provides the economic innovation that, in contrast to traditional modes of financing, entrepreneurs can contract with their future consumers already before the investment decision. Focusing on this ability, this paper argues that crowdfunding leads to a more effective screening of valuable projects. The screening benefit obtains, because the contract can condition the entrepreneur's investment decision on the consumers' reports about their demand. 2 Before illustrating this effect in a concrete example, we first describe how reward crowdfunding works in practice.
The description clarifies the features by which crowdfunding schemes elicit consumers' private information and thereby achieve a more effective screening of projects.
Attracting pledges of more than 2 billion dollars, the most successful crowdfunding platform to date is Kickstarter. 3 It implements crowdfunding as follows. First, the entrepreneur describes her project, consisting of the following three elements: 1) a description of the reward to the consumer, which is typically the entrepreneur's final product; 2) a "pledge level" p; and 3) a "target level" T . After describing these elements, a number, sayñ, of consumers pledge contributions. If the sum of pledges exceed the target level, i.e. ifñ · p ≥ T , the entrepreneur receives the contribution Crowdfunding, however, also seems to exhibit an important economic disadvantage as compared to more traditional modes of financing. More specifically, its replacement of financial intermediaries as investors by an uncoordinated crowd raises important concerns about entrepreneurial moral hazard. 6 Economic theory provides clear efficiency arguments in favor of a specialized financial intermediary. In particular, Diamond (1984) points out that by coordinating investment through a single financial intermediary, free-riding problems associated with monitoring the borrower's behavior are circumvented. Indeed, monitoring to limit moral hazard seems especially important for entrepreneurial financing. Entrepreneurs are typically new players in the market, who, in contrast to well-established firms, have not yet had the ability to build up a reputation to demonstrate their trustworthiness. 7 An analysis of crowdfunding without an explicit consideration of moral hazard seems therefore lopsided. As it turns out, this is even more so, because the crowdfunding scheme's reduction in demand uncertainty interacts with the moral hazard problem: an elimination of demand uncertainty intensifies moral hazard. Hence, in the presence of both demand uncertainty and moral hazard, a non-trivial trade-off concerning the informativeness of optimal mechanisms results.
Using the generalized mechanism design framework of Myerson (1982) , we explicitly address this trade-off. More generally, we characterize mechanisms that optimally address the problem of both demand uncertainty and moral hazard. Myerson's generalized framework assumes the presence of a mediator who coordinates the communication between economic agents. One insight from our analysis is that the crowdfunding platform plays exactly the role of a mediator in the sense of Myerson. Next to this institutional insight, our characterization of optimal mechanisms and their comparison to current crowdfunding platforms yield the following additional insights: 1) Optimal mechanisms reflect reward-based crowdfunding schemes in that crowdfunders do not obtain a monetary return from funding the entrepreneur.
2) Optimal mechanisms reflect all-or-nothing reward crowdfunding schemes in that they condition the entrepreneur's investment decision on the sum of reported con-6 Mollick (2014) considers the funding of ventures "without standard financial intermediaries" as a defining feature of crowdfunding, while Agrawal et al. (2014) stress moral hazard in crowdfunding.
7 Footnotes 11 to 13 discuss actual cases of moral hazard in crowdfunding campaigns. sumer valuations. 3) Optimal mechanisms achieve first-best efficient outcomes only if the ex ante expected returns of the project exceed the entrepreneur's ex ante expected capital costs by a margin that is proportional to the threat of moral hazard. 4) Constrained efficient crowdfunding schemes display underinvestment and not overinvestment, which is consistent with an all-or-nothing reward crowdfunding scheme with a target level that exceeds the entrepreneur's investment costs. 5) Optimal mechanisms defer payments to the entrepreneur in order to reduce the threat of moral hazard, a feature which is reflected by some crowdfunding platforms such as PledgeMusic. 8 6) Optimal mechanisms resolve demand uncertainty only partially, because the moral hazard problem interacts with the reduction in demand uncertainty. Few crowdfunding schemes use deferred payments explicitly and none seem to limit the entrepreneur's information about demand uncertainty actively. This suggests that current crowdfunding schemes deal with moral hazard suboptimally. Yet, by considering an extension in which the mechanism is unable to reach all potential consumers -which reflect current crowdfunding environments more appropriately, we argue that current crowdfunding platforms use deferred payments implicitly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the setup and takes an intuitive approach that identifies the main trade-offs. Section 4 sets up the problem as one of mechanism design. Section 5 characterizes (constrained) efficient mechanisms. Section 6 relates optimal mechanisms to real-life crowdfunding mechanisms and examines extensions.
Section 7 concludes. All formal proofs are collected in the appendix.
Related literature
Being a relatively new phenomenon, the economic literature on crowdfunding is small but growing. Concerning crowdfunding's economic underpinnings, Agrawal et al. (2014) highlight the main issues. They emphasize entrepreneurial moral hazard and mention that crowdfunding can reduce demand uncertainty. Belleflamme et al. (2015) survey current crowdfunding platforms and also point out the use of crowdfunding 8 PledgeMusic explains the use of deferred payments to prevent fraud on its webpage http: //www.pledgemusic.com/blog/220-preventing-fraud (last retrieved 2 November 2015.)
"for market testing under uncertain aggregate demand."
Focusing on price-discrimination, Cornelli (1996) considers a monopolistic firm that, after an initial investment, faces privately informed consumers and characterizes its optimal selling procedure. She explicitly shows that the actual composition of aggregate contributions matters rather than the sum of aggregate contributions (see also Barbieri and Malueg, 2010) . As a result, crowdfunding schemes cannot deal with the price-discrimination problem optimally. Belleflamme et. al (2014) , Ellman and Hurkens (2014) , and Chang (2015) , however, point out that, even though suboptimal, crowdfunding schemes help firms to price discriminate consumers to some degree.
These paper subsequently identify the features of specific crowdfunding schemes that are helpful in this respect. 9
With respect to this literature, the current paper emphasizes that crowdfunding schemes exhibit a crucial economic benefit unrelated to price discrimination. In particular, this paper stresses the role of crowdfunding in "project-value screening", where the screening focuses on identifying differences in the aggregate valuation of consumers, rather than its role in "consumer-specific-screening", where the screening focuses on identifying differences between the individual valuations of consumers and which is the primary goal of price discrimination.
Identifying these two distinctive roles of crowdfunding is also crucial for properly evaluating the welfare properties of crowdfunding schemes and addressing potential regulatory questions: project-value screening univocally benefits both welfare and consumers, whereas the use of crowdfunding as a tool for price discrimination has, at best, ambiguous effects on welfare and consumers (e.g. Bergemann et. al. 2015) .
While there is little work in economics and finance that focuses on the firm's ability to screen for valuable projects by addressing consumers directly, the marketing literature explicitly addresses this issue in its subfield of market research, focusing on consumer surveys and product testing (e.g. Lauga and Ofek 2009 ). Ding (2007) however points out that marketing research relies on voluntary, non-incentivized reporting by consumers. He emphasizes that consumers need to be given explicit incentives for revealing their information truthfully. With respect to this literature, the current 9 Also Hakenes and Schlegel (2015) restrict attention to specific crowdfunding schemes although they do not focus on price discrimination but focus on costly information acquisition.
paper clarifies that crowdfunding schemes provide explicit incentives for truthtelling naturally.
Empirical studies of crowdfunding aim at identifying the crucial features of crowdfunding projects. Studies such as Agrawal et al. (2011) and Mollick (2014) focus on the geographic origin of consumers relative to the entrepreneur, while Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2013) examine the role of social information for the project's success.
Focusing on investment-based crowdfunding, Hildebrand, et al. (2013) identifies an increased problem of moral hazard. Ordanini et al. (2011) present a marketing-based case study on crowdfunding and also note that crowdfunding blurs the boundaries between marketing and finance.
Crowdfunding and the Information Trade-off
This section introduces the framework. It considers an entrepreneur, who can, prior to her investment decision, directly interact with privately informed consumers about whether they value the product. We first model and discuss the role of demand uncertainty, and subsequently introduce the problem of moral hazard.
The entrepreneur. We consider a penniless entrepreneur, who needs an upfront investment of I > 0 from investors to develop her product. After developing it, the entrepreneur can produce the good at some marginal cost c ∈ [0, 1). The entrepreneur is crucial for realizing the project and cannot sell her idea to outsiders. We normalize interest rates to zero.
The crowd. We consider a total of n consumers and denote a specific consumer by the index i = 1, . . . , n. A consumer i either values the good, v i = 1, or not, v i = 0. 10 Hence, the n-dimensional vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ V ≡ {0, 1} n represents the valuation profile of the consumers. We let π(v) denote its corresponding probability.
As a result, the number of consumers with value v = 1, which we express by n 1 , is:
10 The binary structure ensures that demand uncertainty expresses itself only concerning the question whether the entrepreneur should invest without affecting actual pricing decisions. It clarifies that the model's driving force is not price discrimination. Section 6.4 discusses this in more detail.
Since the marginal costs c are smaller than 1, we can take n 1 as the potential demand of the entrepreneur's good. Its randomness expresses the demand uncertainty.
Investing without demand uncertainty. Consider as a benchmark the case of perfect information, where the realized demand n 1 is observable so that the investment decision can directly condition on it. It is socially optimal that the entrepreneur invests if the project's revenue, n 1 , covers the costs of production I + n 1 c, i.e. if
In this case, the project generates an ex ante expected aggregate surplus of
Note that by investing whenever n 1 ≥n and, subsequently, selling the good at a price p = 1, the entrepreneur can appropriate the full surplus. Given that the entrepreneur obtains the funds, this behavior represents her optimal strategy. Anticipating the entrepreneur's optimal behavior, a competitive credit market is willing to lend the amount I at the normalized interest rate of zero. Hence, perfect information yields an efficient outcome.
Investing with demand uncertainty. Next consider the setup with demand uncertainty, i.e. the entrepreneur must decide to invest I without knowing n 1 if she wants to sell the good at some price p. If she does invest, it clearly remains optimal to sell the good at a price p = 1. Hence, expected profits from investing arē Π = n n 1 =0
It is therefore profitable to invest only ifΠ ≥ 0. Even though the price p = 1 does not leave any consumer rents, the entrepreneur's decision to invest leads either to under-or over-investment. For parameter constellations such thatΠ < 0, the entrepreneur will not invest and, hence, under-investment results (because the good is not produced for any n 1 >n, where it would be efficient to produce). For the parameter constellationΠ ≥ 0, the entrepreneur does invest I, but this implies overinvestment (because she produces the good also when it turns out that n 1 <n).
Crowdfunding. We next consider the case of demand uncertainty but with an all-or-nothing reward-based crowdfunding scheme for consumers. This means that the entrepreneur commits to a contract pair (p, T ). As explained in the introduction, its interpretation is that if at least T /p consumers make a pledge so that the total amount of pledged funds, P , exceeds T , then the entrepreneur obtains P , invests, and produces a good for each consumer who pledged. If the total amount of pledges P falls short of T , then the pledges are not triggered and the entrepreneur does not invest.
It is straightforward to see that crowdfunding enables the entrepreneur to extract the maximum aggregate surplus S * and, thereby, achieve an efficient outcome. Indeed, for any p ∈ (0, 1], it is optimal for the consumer to pledge p if and only if v = 1. As a result, exactly n 1 consumers sign up so that the sum of pledges equals P = n 1 p. Hence, the project is triggered whenever T ≤ n 1 p. We conclude that the crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) with p ∈ (0, 1] yields the entrepreneur an expected profit
Price p = 1 and target level T =n maximize these profits, enabling the entrepreneur to extract the associated expected surplus of S * and yielding an efficient outcome.
In comparison to the single consumer example of the introduction, it is worthwhile to point out two additional features of the crowdfunding scheme. First, even without any active coordination between consumers, it circumvents any potential coordination problems. This is because of the schemes second feature: it eliminates any strategic uncertainty concerning both the behavior and the private information of other consumers. In other words, the scheme's conditional pledge system leads to a game between the consumers, in which it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each individual consumer i to pledge if and only if v i = 1.
Moral hazard. The setup until now abstracted from any problems of moral hazard. Consumers are sure to obtain the good as promised if their pledge is triggered.
In practice, consumers may however worry about whether the entrepreneur will in the end deliver a good that meets the initial specifications, or whether they will receive some good at all.
We capture the problem of moral hazard by assuming that, after the entrepreneur obtains the money from the crowdfunding platform, she can "make a run" for it with a share α ∈ [0, 1]. When the entrepreneur "runs", she does not incur any investment or production costs and consumers do not obtain their valuable goods. The parameter α measures the weakness of the institutional environment to prevent moral hazard.
For the extreme α = 0, there is effectively no moral hazard, whereas for the extreme, α = 1, the principal can keep all the pledges without incurring any costs.
The entrepreneur's "running" captures several types of moral hazard problems.
First, we can take the running literally: the entrepreneur is able to flee with the share αP without being caught, or run with the amount P but with an expected fine of (1 − α)P . 11 Second, at a reduced cost of (1 − α)P < I −ñc the entrepreneur can provide the consumer a product that matches the formal description but is still worthless to the consumer. 12 Third, by a (possibly expected) cost (1 − α)P , the entrepreneur can convincingly claim that the project failed so that, without fearing any legal repercussions, she need not deliver the product and keep the pledges. 13
Considering the entrepreneur's decision whether to run, note that she obtains a profit P − I − cP/p from investing. An aggregated pledges of P , therefore, induces the entrepreneur to run if
This holds not only for the extreme α = 1 but also for any α ≥ 1 − c/p. In these cases, consumers rationally expect that the entrepreneur will not deliver the product so that they will not be willing to participate in the crowdfunding scheme. 11 E.g. the project "Code hero" raised $170,954 but never delivered its rewards, Polygon.com states "His critics believe he has run off with the money raised from the kickstarter campaign" (http:
//www.polygon.com/2012/12/18/3781782/code-hero-kickstarter-interview , last retrieved 3
November 2015), whereas the Kickstarter campaign "Asylum Playing Cards" resulted in legal fines "against a crowdfunded project that didn't follow through on its promise to backers" (http:// In the remainder of this section, we introduce two intuitive but ad hoc changes to the crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) that reduces entrepreneurial moral hazard. Using a mechanism design approach, the next section proves that the two changes lead to mechanisms that are indeed optimal in the class of all mechanisms.
An intuitive way to mitigate the moral hazard problem is to transfer the consumer's pledges to the entrepreneur only after having produced the good. Because the penniless entrepreneur needs at least the amount I to develop the product, such a delay in payments is possible only up to the amount I.
Hence, a first, ad hoc step towards mitigating the moral hazard problem is to adjust the crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) and introduce deferred payments as follows.
As before, the price p represents the pledge level of an individual consumer and T the target level which the sum of pledges, P , has to meet before the investment is triggered. Different from before however, the entrepreneur, after learning P , first obtains only the required amount I for developing the product and receives the remaining part P − I only after delivering the good to consumers.
In order to characterize crowdfunding schemes with deferred payments that prevent moral hazard, note that the entrepreneur now obtains only the payoff αI from a run and the payoff P − I − cP/p from realizing the project. Hence, she has no incentive to run if
In particular, the deferred crowdfunding scheme with a pledge level of p = 1 and a target T = (1 + α)I/(1 − c) does not induce any moral hazard. Given this scheme, a consumer with value v = 1 is willing to pledge p = 1 and the scheme leads to an equilibrium outcome in which all consumers with v = 1 pledge and the project is triggered when at least T consumers have the willingness to pay of 1, i.e. if n 1 > (1 + α)I/(1 − c). Although the scheme does prevent moral hazard, it, for any α > 0, does not attain the efficient outcome, because its target level is larger than the socially efficient one; the scheme exhibits under-investment.
The information trade-off. We argued that a crowdfunding scheme with deferred payments can circumvent the moral hazard problem. Since this deferred crowdfunding scheme does not yield an efficient outcome, the question arises whether there are more sophisticated crowdfunding schemes that do better. To show that this is indeed the case, note first that with respect to choosing the efficient investment decision, the entrepreneur only needs to learn whether n 1 is above or belown. The exact value of n 1 is immaterial.
Yet, as inequality (2) reveals, the moral hazard problem intensifies if the entrepreneur obtains full information about P . As discussed, this inequality has to hold for any possible realization of P ≥ T in order to prevent the entrepreneur from running. Because the constraint is most stringent for P = T , a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) prevents moral hazard if and only if T ≥P .
In contrast, if the entrepreneur would only learn that P exceeds T , but not the exact value of P itself, then she rationally anticipates an expected payoff
from not running with the money. Since the conditional expectation E[P |P ≥ T ] obviously exceeds T , a crowdfunding scheme that reveals only whether P exceeds T can deal with the moral hazard problem more efficiently.
Hence, in the presence of both demand uncertainty and moral hazard, the information extraction problem becomes a sophisticated one, because the extraction of demand information interacts with the moral hazard problem. As a result, one neither wants too much nor too little information revelation.
The analysis up to now has been ad hoc. By starting with a simple crowdfunding scheme that reflects all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding schemes in practise and adapting it in two way -introducing deferred payments and reducing its informativeness -we improved its efficiency properties. The ad hoc nature of these two changes, raises the question whether even more efficient crowdfunding mechanisms exist.
In order to study this question, the next section first sets up the crowdfunding problem as one of optimal mechanism design. It subsequently formally proves that the payout-deferred and information-restricted reward crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) towards which we argued intuitively is indeed optimal in the class of all mechanisms.
In other words, such crowdfunding schemes are an indirect implementation of the optimal direct mechanism.
Crowdfunding and Mechanism Design
In this section we cast the entrepreneur's economic problem into a problem of mechanism design and characterize optimal mechanisms. In order to treat the entrepreneur's moral hazard, we use the framework of Myerson (1982) , which handles both unobservable information and unobservable actions. This generalized framework introduces a mediator, who coordinates the communication between economic agents and gives incentive compatible recommendations concerning the unobservable actions that lead to moral hazard. One of the insights from this analysis is that crowdfunding platforms play exactly the role of a mediator in the sense of Myerson (1982) . The section's main result is to confirm formally that the payout-deferred and information-restricted reward crowdfunding scheme as identified in the previous section is a (constrained) efficient mechanism.
Economic Allocations. In order to cast the entrepreneur's investment problem in a framework of mechanism design, we first make precise the feasible economic allocations: Crowdfunding seeks to implement an allocation between one cash-constrained entrepreneur, player 0, and n consumers, players 1 to n. It involves monetary transfers and production decisions. Concerning monetary transfers, consumers can make transfers to the entrepreneur both before and after the entrepreneur's investment decision. We denote the ex ante transfer from consumer i to the entrepreneur by t a i and the ex post transfer by t p i . Concerning the production decisions, the allocation describes whether the entrepreneur invests, x 0 = 1, or not,
x 0 = 0, and whether the entrepreneur produces a good for consumer i, x i = 1, or not,
Feasible Allocations. By the very nature of the crowdfunding problem, the entrepreneur does not have the resources to finance the required investment I > 0.
The entrepreneur's financial constraints imply the following restrictions on feasible allocations. First, if the entrepreneur invests (x 0 = 1), the transfers of the consumers must be enough to cover the investment costs I. Moreover, the entrepreneur can not make any net positive ex ante transfers to consumers if she does not invest (x 0 = 0).
Second, aggregate payments must be enough to cover the entrepreneur's investment and production costs. To express these two feasibility requirements, we say that an
In addition, an entrepreneur can only produce a good to a consumer if she developed it. To express this feasibility requirement, we say that an allocation a = (t, x) is development feasible if, whenever the good is produced for at least one consumer, the entrepreneur invested in its development:
∃i :
This condition logically implies that if x 0 = 0 then x i = 0 for all i.
Let the set A ⊂ R 2n ×{0, 1} n+1 denote the set of budget-and development-feasible allocations, i.e. allocations that satisfy (3) and (4).
the valuation profile of the consumers. We denote the probability of v ∈ V by π(v) and the conditional probability
so that we can express the conditional probability simply as π i (v −i ). Moreover, we assume that consumers are identical:
A feasible allocation a ∈ A yields a consumer i with value v i the payoff
and the entrepreneur the payoff
where the inequality follows directly from the second inequality in (3), implying that any feasible allocation yields the entrepreneur a non-negative payoff.
Efficiency. An output schedule x ∈ X is Pareto efficient in state v if and only if it maximizes the aggregate net surplus
With respect to efficiency, two different types of production decisions matter: the overall investment decision x 0 and the individual production decisions x i . Given v l = 0 < c < v h = 1, efficiency with respect to the individual allocations requires
we can fully characterize the Pareto efficient output schedule x * (v) as follows.
For
implying that π * expresses the ex ante probability that the project is executed.
Although transfers are immaterial for Pareto efficiency, we must nevertheless ensure that the efficient output schedule x * (v) can indeed be made part of some feasible allocation a ∈ A. In order to specify one such feasible allocation, we define the first best allocation a * (v) as follows.
By construction a * (v) is feasible and yields an ex ante expected gross surplus (gross of investment costs) of
We further say that an output schedule
This condition is the converse of development feasibility (4). If it does not hold, it implies the inefficiency that there is a state v in which the entrepreneur invests I but no consumer consumes the good. Although technically feasible, a schedule that is not development efficient is not Pareto efficient, since it wastes the investment I > 0.
For future reference, the following lemma summarizes these considerations.
Lemma 1 The first best allocation a * (v) is feasible and exhibits an output schedule that is development efficient. It yields an expected net surplus of W * − π * I.
14 For i v =n, the output schedule x * 0 = x * i = 0 is also efficient, but this is immaterial (and can only arise for the non-generic case that I is a multiple of 1 − c).
Mechanisms. We next turn to mechanisms. A mechanism Γ is a set of rules between the entrepreneur and the n consumers that induces a game. Its outcome is an allocation a ∈ A with payoffs Π(a) and U i (a|v i ). In line with Myerson (1982) , we interpret the crowdfunding platform as the mediator, who runs the mechanism;
it credibly commits to enforce the rules of the game which the mechanism specifies, and it coordinates the communication between participants.
At the end of Section 3, we considered one such mechanism: the payout-deferred, information restricted, all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding scheme Γ CF = (p, T ).
This mechanism induces the following game between the entrepreneur and consumers enforced by the crowdfunding platform: Each consumer i sends to the platform a confidential binary message m i ∈ {0, 1}. If i m i p < T , the platform enforces the allocation t a i = t p i = x i = x 0 = 0. If i m i p ≥ T , the platform enforces the ex ante payments t a i = I/ i m i . In case the entrepreneur does not run, it subsequently enforces outputs x i = m i and transfers t p i = p − t a i . In case the entrepreneur runs, the platform enforces outputs x i = 0 and transfers t p i = 0. The main task of this section is to demonstrate that this type of mechanism is indeed optimal. In order to do so, it is common to first introduce a different class of mechanisms: direct mechanisms.
A direct mechanism is a function γ : V → A, which induces the following game. 15
First, consumers simultaneously and independently send a (confidential) report v r i about their values to the platform. Based on the collected reports v r and in line with the rules γ, the platform collects the funds T a = i t a i (v r ) from the consumers and transfers them to the entrepreneur together with the recommendation x 0 (v r ) about whether to invest I. To capture the moral hazard problem, we explicitly assume that the platform cannot coerce the entrepreneur into following the recommendation x 0 = 1. That is, the entrepreneur is free to follow or reject it. If, however, the entrepreneur follows the recommendation, the platform enforces the production schedule x(v r ) = (x 1 (v r ), . . . , x n (v r )) and the transfers t p i (v r ). If the entrepreneur does not follow the recommendation to invest, but runs, then individual production schedules are 0, and no ex post transfers flow, i.e. x i = t p i = 0. Moreover, consumers forfeit their ex ante 15 Hence, we study the extreme where the entrepreneur contracts with all n consumers. In section 6.2 we address extensions where the mechanism can reach only a subset of all consumers.
transfers t a i .
A direct mechanism γ is incentive compatible if its induced game as described above has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which 1) consumers are truthful in that they reveal their values honestly, i.e. v r i = v i , and 2) the entrepreneur is obedient in that she follows the recommendation, i.e. x 0 = x 0 (v r ).
To formalize the notion of truthful revelation, we define
Consequently, we say that a direct mechanism γ is truthful if
To formalize the notion of obedience, we define for a direct mechanism γ the set T a as the set of possible aggregate ex ante transfers which the mechanism can induce conditional on recommending investment:
Given this set we define for any T a ∈ T a the set V (T a ) which comprises all states that induce a recommendation to invest together with a total transfer T a :
Upon receiving a recommendation to invest, the entrepreneur has received some transfer T a ∈ T a and has a belief π(v|T a ) that the state is v. These beliefs are Bayes' consistent whenever
With this notation, we say that a direct mechanism γ is obedient if for any T a ∈ T a and after obtaining the recommendation to invest, x 0 = 1, the entrepreneur is better off investing than taking the money and run, given her updated belief π(v|T a ):
We say that a direct mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is truthful and obedient.
By its nature, participation in the crowdfunding mechanism is voluntary so that it must yield the consumers and the entrepreneur at least their outside option. Taking these outside options as 0, the entrepreneur's participation is not an issue, because, as argued, any feasible allocation yields the entrepreneur a non-negative payoff. In contrast, a consumer's participation in an incentive compatible direct mechanism is
To summarize, we say that a direct mechanism γ is feasible, if it is incentive compatible and individual rational for each consumer. 16 A feasible direct mechanism yields consumer i with valuation v i the utility
and the entrepreneur an expected payoff
Finally, we say that two feasible direct mechanisms γ = (t, x) and γ = (t , x ) are payoff-equivalent if they lead to identical payoffs to each consumer type v i :
Implementability. An allocation function f : V → A specifies for any value
profile v an allocation a ∈ A. It is implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ such that the induced game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in which the induced allocation coincides with f (v) for every v ∈ V . In this case, we say Γ implements f .
Likewise, an output schedule x : V → X specifies for any value profile v an output schedule x ∈ X. It is implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ such that the induced game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in which the induced output coincides with x(v) for every v ∈ V . In this case, we say Γ implements output schedule x(·).
By the revelation principle, an allocation function f (·) is implementable if and only if there exists a feasible direct mechanism γ with γ(v) = f (v) for any v ∈ V . Likewise, an output schedule x(·) is implementable if and only if there exists a direct mechanism
Hence, as usual, the revelation principle motivates incentive compatibility as one of the defining requirements of feasibility. A first question that arises is whether an efficient output schedule is always implementable. Considering a specific version of the model, the next proposition demonstrates that this is not the case:
Proposition 1 For I = n − 1/2, α = 1, and c = 0, the efficient output schedule
The proposition implies that, in general, the efficient output is not implementable.
The main driver behind this inefficiency result is a tension between the entrepreneur's budget constraint and the moral hazard problem. For consumers to make sure that the entrepreneur realizes her project, it does not suffice to give her simply the required amount I to invest. Due to the moral hazard problem, she must also be given an incentive to actually invest this money. The proposition shows that for the efficient output schedule x * this is, in general, not possible.
The proposition raises questions about which output schedules are generally implementable and about the conditions under which the efficient schedule is implementable. To answer these questions we investigate the mechanism design problem further. The following lemma shows that with respect to development-efficient allocations, we may reduce the class of feasible direct mechanisms further.
Lemma 2 If γ = (t, x) is feasible and x is development-efficient then there is a feasible and payoff equivalent direct mechanismγ
The lemma implies that with respect to development-efficient mechanisms there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to feasible direct mechanisms that give the entrepreneur exactly the amount I if the entrepreneur is to develop the product.
The lemma therefore makes precise the suggestion of the previous section that a mechanism should provide the entrepreneur with the minimal amount of information for reducing demand uncertainty; effectively, she should only be told that the demand of consumers ensures that the project has a positive NPV, but not more. The main step in proving this result is to show that obedience remains satisfied when we replace different aggregate levels of ex ante payments by a single one. 17
The lemma simplifies the mechanism design problem in two respects. First, under condition (12), condition (3) reduces to
Second, under condition (12), we have T a = {I} so that the obedience constraint (8) must only be respected with regard to I:
(Constrained) efficient mechanisms
In this section we characterize second best mechanisms γ sb = (x sb , t sb ) that maximize aggregate surplus in the presence of demand uncertainty and moral hazard. We are especially interested in determining the circumstances under which these second best mechanisms do not implement the efficient output schedule x * .
Recall that a feasible direct mechanism γ yields a surplus of
17 The lemma fails for development-inefficient mechanisms so that we cannot dispense with the restriction to development-efficient mechanisms.
Clearly γ sb cannot yield more than W * − π * I, which is generated under the efficient output schedule x * . Indeed, Proposition 1 showed that, in general, γ sb achieves strictly less.
As γ sb is necessarily development-efficient, we can find it by maximizing (15) subject to the constraints (7), (9), (12), (13), and (14), because these constraints characterize the set of implementable allocation functions that are development-efficient.
The maximization problem yields the following partial characterization of γ sb :
Lemma 3 The individual rationality constraint of consumers with the high value v i = 1 does not restrict the second best mechanism γ sb . The second best mechanism exhibits x i (0, v −i ) = X i (0) = T i (0) = 0, and T i (1) = X i (1) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
It follows from the previous lemma that the second best mechanism γ sb is a solution to the problem P : max
T i (0) = 0 for all i;
x i (v) = 1 ⇒ x 0 (v) = 1;
Recalling that π * represents the ex ante probability that the project is executed under the efficient schedule x * , we obtain the following result. Proposition 2 makes precise the parameter constellation under which the first best
x * is implementable: only if the efficient production schedule x * generates a surplus that exceeds the ex ante expected investment costs (1 + α) times. For values of W * in between π * I and (1 + α)π * I, the optimal mechanism exhibit inefficiencies.
Intuitively, the driver behind these inefficiencies is a tension between the entrepreneur's budget constraint and her moral hazard problem. For consumers to make sure that the entrepreneur realizes her project, it does not suffice to give her simply the required amount I to invest. Due to the moral hazard problem, she must also be given an incentive to actually invest this money. As the proposition shows, this effectively requires consumers to pay the entrepreneur the run-away payoff αI. The project is therefore only worthwhile if the project's revenue recovers the augmented investment cost (1 + α)I.
Effectively, the proposition shows that the combination of the entrepreneur's budget constraint and her moral hazard problem increases investment costs by a factor α. It prevents first best outcomes if the expected gross surplus W * is too small.
Whenever the ex ante gross surplus does not exceed the expected investment costs by the factor α, the efficient output schedule, x * , is not implementable so that the second best output schedule x sb does not coincide with x * . We next characterize both the second best and the type of inefficiencies it exhibits.
Proposition 3 For W * <W α , the constrained efficient output schedule x sb exhibits i) x sb i (v) = v i whenever x sb 0 (v) = 1; ii) x sb 0 (v) = 0 whenever x * 0 (v) = 0; and iii) x sb 0 (v) = 1 whenever v i > (1 + α)I/(1 − c). Moreover, an indirect payout-deferred, information restricted, all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding scheme Γ CF = (p, T ) implements x sb .
The first part of the proposition shows that the constrained efficient output schedules are only distorted with respect to the investment decision but not to the individual assignments. The second part of the proposition shows that the second best output schedule is distorted downwards rather than upwards. The third part shows that at most the allocations for which aggregate valuations lie in the range between W * andW α are downward distorted. This final statement also implies that for the constrained efficient output schedule it matters only whether the sum of valuations exceed a target level T . As a result, the second best scheme can be implemented indirectly by a crowdfunding scheme (1, T ).
Interpretation and Discussion
This section interprets the optimal direct mechanism as derived in the previous section and relates it to crowdfunding platforms in practise. It further discusses extensions and robustness of the results.
Comparison to current crowdfunding platforms
Relating our theoretical results to current crowdfunding platforms, our first observation concerns the role of the crowdfunding platform itself. In our formal analysis the platforms structures the communication between entrepreneur and consumers, and executes the mechanism. We note that this is fully in line with the role that crowdfunding platforms play in practise. Platforms such as Kickstarter emphasize that they are not involved in the development of the projects themselves and take no responsibility in guaranteeing the entrepreneur's project. 18 Wikipedia therefore calls the platform "a moderating organization". Tellingly, the technical term of the platform's role in (extended) mechanism design is "mediator" (e.g. Myerson 1982) .
Although the platform's role seems only minor, it is nevertheless crucial. Due to commitment problems, it cannot be performed by either the entrepreneur or the consumers.
A second notable feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they explicitly condition the entrepreneur's investment decision on the sum of reported valuations rather than each consumer's report individually. This is consistent with the many "all-or-nothing" pledge schemes of popular reward crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter. In other words, these schemes are indirect mechanisms that implement the conditional investment.
A third feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they do not exhibit negative transfers. Hence, at no point in time the entrepreneur needs to pay consumers any money. In particular, she does not share her revenue after the investment: t p i (v) ≥ 0. Consequently, optimal mechanisms do not turn consumers into investors; the optimal crowdfunding scheme is not investment-based. This feature is consistent with current reward crowdfunding: a crowdfunding consumer receives only a nonmonetary reward for his pledged contribution. Reward-crowdfunding schemes such as Kickstarter explicitly prohibit any monetary transfers to crowdfunders. 19, 20 A fourth feature of optimal direct mechanisms is a deferred payout to prevent moral hazard. Some but definitely not all crowdfunding platforms do so. For instance, PledgeMusic, a crowdfunding platform specialized in raising money for music recordings, uses deferred payouts to prevent fraud. 21
A final notable feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they provide only information about whether the sum of pledges exceeds the target and not the total sum of pledges itself. In line with Lemma 2 any additional information is not needed to implement (constrained) efficient outcomes, and schemes that provide more information may exacerbate the moral hazard problem. Current crowdfunding platforms do not reflect this feature. Currently all crowdfunding platforms are fully transparent and announce publicly the total amount of pledges rather than just whether the target level was reached.
To summarize, current all-or-nothing reward crowdfunding platforms reflect many crucial features of the optimal mechanisms underlying our theoretical model. They, however, do not seem to deal with moral hazard optimally. The next section addresses especially this latter point.
Limited Consumer Reach
The previous section suggests that current crowdfunding schemes deal with moral hazard suboptimally. In particular, they rarely use deferred payments, which, as shown by PledgeMusic, seems relatively straightforward to implement. On the other 19 See https://www.kickstarter.com/rules?ref=footer, last retrieved 22 July 2015. 20 The next section argues however that a limited reach of the platform results in crowd-investment. 21 See http://www.pledgemusic.com/blog/220-preventing-fraud , last retrieved 20 July 2015.
hand, there seems nevertheless little indication that in practise fraud is a prevalent problem in crowdfunding. Mollick (2013) , for instance, reports that fraudulent failures for Kickstarter projects are very rare (well below 5%).
Since crowdfunding platforms currently reach only a very small part of potential demand, this section argues that even though crowdfunding schemes do not use deferred payout explicitly, they do so implicitly. The argument is that the entrepreneur's prospect to sell her products to consumers who did not participate in crowdfunding acts as a direct substitute for deferred payments. 22
Motivated by the observation that crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before their investment, our formal analysis took this idea to the extreme and implicitly assumed that the entrepreneur could contract with every potential consumer. Given this extreme position, the revelation principle implies that there is indeed no loss of generality in assuming that mechanisms allow consumers to acquire the product only through the mechanism. This evidently changes when, for some exogenous reason, not all consumers can participate in the mechanism. In practise this is a highly relevant concern, because a share of consumers may fail to notice the crowdfunding scheme, not have access to the internet, or only arrive in the market after the product has been developed. Hence, a relevant extension of our framework is to consider mechanisms, which, for some exogenous reason, have an imperfect consumer-reach.
In order to make this more concrete, consider an extension of the model in which only a share of β ∈ (0, 1) can partake in the mechanism. Already the pure proportional case that a consumer's ability to participate is independent of his valuation, yields new important insights.
Note first that for this pure proportional case, the crowdfunding scheme is still able to elicit the project's value: a pledge byñ consumers means that the project is worth n 1 =ñ/β. Consequently, investment is efficient if and only if
It is straightforward to see that the previous analysis still applies when we factor in β.
In particular, the efficient output scheme is implementable for W * ≥ (1 + α)π * Iβ. 23
In order to see that, with limited consumer reach, a classic reward crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) without deferred payments can withstand moral hazard even for the extreme case α = 1, note that when only a share of β potential consumers can be reached, inequality (1), which describes the condition under which the entrepreneur has a strict incentive to run, changes to
Hence, whereas, under full consumer reach (β = 1), a reward crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) without deferred payments is unable to withstand moral hazard whenever α > 1 − c/p − I/P , it does withstand moral hazard when its consumer reach is limited to β <β. The reason for this follows the logic behind deferred payments: the limited consumer reach effectively implies that a pledge level P constitutes a deferred payment of P/β − P > 0.
Apart from reducing the threat of moral hazard, the extension reveals an important additional economic effect: consumers may become actual investors when the share of crowdfunding consumers β is small. To see this, note that, because the entrepreneur needs the amount I to develop the product, the (average) ex ante transfer of a pledging consumer needs to be at least I/ñ. When β is small in the sense that n(β) is smaller than 1, it follows that forñ close ton(β), the consumer's ex ante transfer exceeds his willingness to pay. Individual rationality then implies that the ex post transfer to the consumer is negative. Hence, the optimal mechanism turns consumers in investors; they finance the entrepreneur's investment and share in her revenues.
As noted, reward crowdfunding schemes such as Kickstarter explicitly prohibit monetary transfers to crowdfunders. Our formal analysis confirms that this is indeed not needed if the investment I is small compared to the number of crowdfunding consumers, but for large investments such restrictions may matter. 24 23 This "proportionality" property holds because the derived efficient scheme extracts all rents from consumers and the entrepreneur can implement the efficient outcome by using the scheme as derived and set a price p = 1 to the (1 − β)n consumers who can only participate after the good has been developed. Finally note that all-or-nothing crowdfunding schemes also give consumers a strict incentive to participate in the crowdfunding scheme, even if they have the option to wait and buy the product later in the after market. This is so, because a consumer may be pivotal for the entrepreneur's decision whether to produce the good. Hence, facing a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) a consumer is strictly better off participating (provided that he expects that the after market price is not lowered, which in our model would indeed not be the case). Hence, next to eliciting the consumer's valuation in an incentive compatible manner, crowdfunding schemes also exhibit features, which support the incentive compatibility of participation. 25
Entrepreneur's private cost information
Both the first best and the optimal (constrained) efficient mechanism condition on the entrepreneur's investment cost I and marginal cost c. The optimal mechanism, therefore, exploits the assumption that costs are public information. In practise, one may worry that the entrepreneur is better informed about these costs than consumers.
In this case, the costs become the entrepreneur's private information so that if the mechanism is to condition on this information, it must incentivize the entrepreneur to reveal it. This may potentially lead to new distortions.
Note that because the optimal mechanism implements an allocation in which the entrepreneur obtains all the rents, one might be tempted to argue that the entrepreneur's incentives are fully aligned with social welfare so that the mechanism automatically gives her the proper incentives to reveal her private information truthfully. This reasoning is however incomplete, because it only considers a unilateral deviation. Hence, even though the reasoning implies that a single deviation to misreport costs is not profitable, the combined deviation of misreporting costs and, which in 2008 introduced an "all-or-nothing" crowdfunding model, but also shared revenue with its crowdfunders. Supporters of a successful project not only obtained the shirt, but also shared in some of the revenue of its future sales. (see http://www.cnet.com/news/ cameesa-a-threadless-where-customers-are-also-investors/, last retrieved 22 July 2015). 25 Next to the probability to be pivotal and the consumer's expectation of the price in the after market, a consumer's specific incentives to participate will also depend on other factors from which our model abstracts: time-preferences, the probability that the project will succeed, and the possibility that the consumer can better judge the product after it has been successfully produced.
subsequently, running away with the money run may be profitable. Therefore, the crowdfunding schemeΓ CF implements the first best with private information about costs only if W * ≥W α and a combined deviation is not profitable.
To examine the implications of this in closer detail, suppose that W * ≥W α so that, under the assumption that I and c are public information, the efficient output x * is implementable by the schemeΓ CF . Now first assume that only c is private information. It is then straightforward to show that, the schemeΓ CF automatically induces the entrepreneur to report c truthfully, provided that she does not run away.
In order to see thatΓ CF does not imply an incentive compatibility with respect to the combined deviation of misreporting and running away, defineπ(T ) as the probability that the sum of consumer valuations exceeds T , i.e.
Now suppose the platform offers the schemeΓ CF with the targetT = I/(1 − c), but, not observing c, asks the entrepreneur to report it before implementing the scheme.
Instead of reporting truthfully and obtain the gross revenue W * , the strategy to report A comparison of the lemma to Proposition 2 reveals that with private information about c, the efficient output is more difficult to implement when c is private information. The intuition for this result is that by reporting a lower cost c, the entrepreneur can raise the probability that the project is financed and this increases the threat of moral hazard.
It is straightforward to extend the previous reasoning to the case when also I is private information. In this case, an implementation ofΓ CF requires the entrepreneur The proposition shows that the entrepreneur's private information about costs does not affect our main qualitative results. In particular, both the result that efficiency is implementable when the ex ante gross surplus W * is large enough and the result that moral hazard effectively implies a mark-up on the investment costs still hold. Note also that if there is no moral hazard (α = 0), then private information about costs does not affect the optimal crowdfunding mechanism at all. Hence, private information about costs only affect outcomes to the extent that it intensifies the moral hazard problem proportionally.
Crowdfunding and price discrimination
In our formal analysis, we assumed that consumers either do not value the good (v = v l = 0) or value it at the same positive amount (v = v h = 1). We stress that this assumption should not be understood as a simplifying one, but as one that, by contrasting it to the existing literature, allows us to identify different strengths and weaknesses of crowdfunding schemes.
To make this more precise, note that a defining features of a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) is that it conditions the investment decision on the sum of pledges. Cornelli (1996, p.18 ), however, explicitly shows that, for achieving optimal price discrimination, the actual composition of this sum rather than the sum itself matters. As a result, crowdfunding schemes cannot deal with the price-discrimination problem optimally (see also Barbieri and Malueg 2010) . In contrast, our results show that, even in the presence of entrepreneurial moral hazard, conditioning on the sum of pledges is optimal when eliciting the overall value of the project does not require price discrimination.
Hence, by restriction to our binary consumer valuations and comparing our results to the earlier literature, we are able to identify two different economic effects of crowdfunding and compare the ability of crowdfunding to take advantage of them: whereas crowdfunding schemes are optimal tools for "project-value screening", where the aggregate valuation of consumers matters, they are suboptimal tools for "consumerspecific-screening'', which is a defining feature of price discrimination.
The distinction between the two modes of screening is also important for evaluating the welfare effects of crowdfunding: project-value screening unambiguously benefits welfare and consumers, whereas the welfare properties of consumer-specificscreening as a tool for price discrimination are, as is well-known, ambiguous.
In practise however the two screening modes are tightly connected and it is therefore hard to isolate them empirically. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that the current crowdfunding schemes are also used for price-discrimination. 26 Moreover, current crowdfunding platforms offer extensive evaluation tools that enable entrepreneurs to obtain much more information than just whether there is enough demand for covering the costs of the project. We however point out that if the main role of the schemes is to provide a tool of price-discrimination, then one should expect schemes which do not condition the project on the sum of pledges.
Crowdfunding vs. Venture Capitalists
By enabling direct interactions with consumers before the investment, crowdfunding leads to a transformation of the entrepreneurial business model. Ordanini et al.
(2011) emphasize that the transformation takes place at a fundamental level, blur-26 E.g. The Economist (2010) reports the concrete example of a book publisher planning to fund a renewed publication of a sold-out book: "his efforts to tease out lenders' price sensitivity from previous Kickstarter projects showed that a $50 contribution was the most popular amount. It also Although this fundamental perspective is correct if one views reward crowdfunding as an exclusive alternative to specialized venture capitalists, we emphasize that crowdfunding and venture capital financing are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, we view the two forms as highly complementary. In line with Diamond (1984) , we see the advantage of venture capitalists (or banks) in reducing the moral hazard problem, which in terms of the paper's model implies a reduction in α. In contrast, the strength of crowdfunding lies in learning about the economic value of the project.
Because the analysis of a fully-fledged model which combines venture capitalists and crowdfunding lies outside the scope of the current paper, we just mention that we see no reason why a venture capitalist may not use crowdfunding to learn about demand or why after a successful crowdfunding campaign an entrepreneur may not approach a venture capitalist. Indeed, Dingman (2013) reports that exactly this occurred in the case of the Pebble Smart Watch. Venture capitalist decided to support the entrepreneur's project only after a successful crowdfunding campaign 27 In contrast, "investment-based crowdfunding" upholds the traditional separation between finance and marketing, because the consumers and the crowd-investors are typically not the same economic agents.
on Kickstarter. Quoting a managing partner of a venture capitalist firm: "What venture capital always wants is to get validation, and with Kickstarter, he [i.e. the entrepreneur] could prove there was a market."
Conclusion
Crowdfunding provides the innovation that, already before the product is developed, an entrepreneur can write contracts with her potential consumers. In the presence of demand uncertainty, this enables entrepreneurs to use crowdfunding as a tool that screens for valuable projects. Our formal analysis confirms that optimal mechanisms do take on this particular role of screening. Current all-or-nothing reward crowdfunding schemes such as Kickstarter reflect the main features of these optimal mechanisms.
In particular, they are consistent with the idea that these schemes are used to improve the selection of entrepreneurial projects. This promotes social welfare.
Our analysis further shows that, despite the effectiveness of reward crowdfunding schemes in screening for project value, their susceptibility to entrepreneurial moral hazard may prevent the implementation of fully efficient outcomes. In the presence of moral hazard, crowdfunding can attain fully efficient outcomes only if the project's ex ante expected gross return exceeds its ex ante expected investment costs by a markup whose size reflects the severeness of the moral hazard problem. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment, but still reflect crucial features of current allor-nothing reward crowdfunding schemes.
Because crowdfunding schemes by themselves are, in the presence of moral hazard, unable to attain efficiency in general, we see them as complements rather than substitutes for traditional venture capital. We therefore expect a convergence of the two financing forms. Venture capitalists provide their economic benefit in reducing moral hazard. Crowdfunding platforms provide their economic benefit in learning about the project's value. Current policy measures such as the US JOBS Act and its implementation in SEC (2015) will make such mixed forms of crowdfunding and more traditional venture capitalism easier to develop and take advantage of their respective strengths. The website of the crowdfunding platform Rockethub already explicitly mentions this possible effect of the JOBS Act. 28
Finally, in order to focus on the trade-off between demand uncertainty and entrepreneurial moral hazard -which we view as two fundamental first order effects in crowdfunding -our analysis necessarily abstracts from many other relevant aspects of crowdfunding. For instance, we do not address the role of crowdfunders in promoting the product, the dynamics in pledging behavior in actual crowdfunding schemes, or consumer uncertainty about the quality of the product unrelated to moral hazard. Apart from pointing out that crowdfunding and external capital provision in the form of venture capital are complements, we also do not provide a formal analysis of the interaction between external financing and reward crowdfunding. We moreover do not address possible issues concerning the platform's commitment to enforce the mechanism honestly. Since the platform is a long-term player we conjecture that its honesty can be uphold by well-known reputational arguments in repeated games (see Strausz, 2005) . This however requires payments to the platform, another aspect we do not touch upon. In addition, we consider entrepreneurs, who produce a pure private good without any network effects or other externalities between consumers.
Even though we consider all these issues important and relevant, they lie outside the scope of the current investigation.
Summing over i it follows
Likewise, since X i (1) = p i (1 n−1 ), (9) for v i = 1 implies after a multiplication with p i (1) and using
Summing over i yields
Combining (30) and (32) 
But since 2n − 1 > n, this contradicts (28). Q.E.D. 
Proof of
Sincex is feasible and development efficient, it holdsn(v) > 0 if and only ifx 0 (v) = 1. Hence, the transformed transfer schedulet is well-defined. By
for any v withx 0 (v) = 1. Hence, the allocation (t(v),x(v)) satisfies (12). Because the allocation (t(v),x(v)) is development feasible, also the allocation (t(v),x(v)) is development feasible. Moreover, fromt a i (v) +t p i (v) =t a i (v) +t p i (v) it follows that (t,x) is also budget-feasible, truthful, and individual rational, given that (t,x) is so by assumption.
In order to show that (t,x) is feasible, it only remains to show that it is obedient, i.e., satisfies (8). To show this, define forT a ∈T ā
Now since,γ = (t,x) is obedient by assumption, (8) holds for anyT a ∈T a . Given thatT a = it a i (v) for any v such thatπ(v|T a ) > 0, we can rewrite (8) 
Because, by construction it a i (v) = I for v such thatπ(v|T a ) > 0, this rewrites as
Moreover, since feasibility implies thatT a ≥ I, the previous inequality implies that
It follows after a further multiplication byP (T a ) that v∈V n i=1π (v|T a )P (T a )(t p i (v) − cx i (v)) ≥ αI ·P (T a ), for allT a ∈T a .
By definition ofπ(v|T a ), we haveπ(v|T a )P (T a ) = π(v)1 v∈V (T a ) , where 1 A is the indicator function which is 1 if the statement A is true and 0 otherwise. Thus we may rewrite the former inequality as
Summing over allT a ∈T a , we obtain
Denoting byV (·) andP (·) under the mechanismγ the corresponding setsV (·) and probabilitiesP (·) under the mechanismγ, we can, after noting thatT a = {I} and
which we can further rewrite as
but, since forγ we haveT a = {I}, this is equivalent to
Hence,γ satisfies (8) so thatγ = (t,x) is obedient. To complete the proof note that
, the feasible direct mechanismγ = (t,x) is payoff equivalent to original mechanismγ = (t,x).
Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 3: The first statement follows because the incentive constraint (7) for v i = 1, and the individual rationality (9) of a consumer with value v = 0 imply the individual rationality (9) for v i = 1. That is, 1 ·
To see x i (0, v −i ) = 0, note that if not, then x i (0, v −i ) = 1. But then lowering it to 0 raises the objective (15) by p(0, v −i )c. This change is feasible, because it keeps constraints (7) for v i = 0, (9), and (12) unaffected, while relaxing the constraints (7) for v i = 1, (13), and (14). The statement X i (0) = 0 then follows as a corollary.
To see T i (0) = 0, note that (9) 
leads to a feasible mechanism with T i (0) = 0 and the same value for the objective (15). The adapted mechanism is feasible since the change does not affect (7) and (12), and, by construction, satisfies (9) for v i = 0 so that, by the first argument of this lemma, it also satisfies (9) for v i = 1. The raises in t p i (v) further relaxes (13) and (14). Consequently, there is no loss of generality in assuming that, at the optimum, T i (0) = 0.
To see T i (1) = X i (1), note that (7) for v i = 1 together with X i (0) = T i (0) = 0 imply T i (1) ≤ X i (1). But if T i (1) < X i (1), then we can raise all t p i (1, v −i ) by ε > 0 such that T i (1) = X i (1). The increase is feasible and does not affect the objective (15) . To see that the change is feasible, note that it relaxes constraint (7) for v i = 0 and, by construction, satisfies (7) for v i = 1. It further does not affect (9) for v i = 0 and, by the first part of the lemma, the constraint (9) for v i = 1 is redundant. It also does not affect (12), while relaxing (13) and (14). Consequently, there is no loss of generality in assuming that, at the optimum, T i (1) = X i (1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Recalling that π * = v∈V 1 π(v), define
We first prove that under condition (44) the first best is implementable by constructing a transfer schedulet such that the direct mechanism γ * = (t, x * ) is feasible and therefore implements x * . For any v such that x * 0 (v) = 0, sett a i (v) =t p i (v) = 0. For any v such that x * 0 (v) = 1, letx * (v) ≡ i x * i (v) > 0 represents the efficient number of goods to be produced in state v. 29 Sett a i (v) = x * i (v)I/x * (v) and t p i (v) = x * i (v)(1 − I/x * (v)). We show that the resulting mechanism γ * = (t, x * ) is direct and feasible. More specifically, for each v ∈ V the allocation γ * (v) satisfies (3) so that γ * is direct (it trivially satisfies (4), since x * does so by construction). Moreover, the direct mechanism γ * satisfies (7), (8), and (9) for each v ∈ V .
To show (3) for v such that x * 0 (v) = 0, note that it a i (v) = 0 = Ix * 0 (v), and that
where the inequality holds because x * (0) = 1 is efficient by assumption so that i v i ≥ I + i cv i . Hence, γ(v) ∈ A for all v so that the mechanism γ * is direct. 29x * (v) is greater than 0, since x * 0 (v) = 1 and x * is development-efficient.
To show (7) and (9) note that x * i (0) = 0 implies X * i (0) = 0 and, by construction oft, also T * i (0) = 0. Moreover, X * i (1) ≥ 0 and T * i (1) ≥ 0. For v i = 0, it therefore (7) and (9) are satisfied for v i = 0. To see that they are also satisfied for v i = 1,
. Finally, to show (8), first note that for γ * we have T * = {I} and π(v|I) = π * (v) so that we only need to show v∈V
where the inequality uses (44).
We next show that if condition (44) is violated so that
then there does not exist a transfer schedulet such that the direct mechanism γ = (t, x * ) is feasible. In particular, we show there does not exist a transfer schedulet such that (t, x * ) satisfies (16)-(22).
For the efficient output schedule
For v ∈ V 0 , it therefore holds x i (v) = 0 so that conditions (19) and (20) taken
For v ∈ V 1 , (19) implies i t a i (v) = I. Multiplying by π(v) and summing up over all v in V 1 yields
Since (19) implies T a = {I}, it follows that π * · π(v|I) = π(v) for v ∈ V 1 and π(v|I) = 0 for all v ∈ V 0 . Hence, after a multiplication by π * we can rewrite (17) as
Combining (49) and (50) yields
Since
Since (47) by π * and rearranging terms yields
Combining this latter inequality with inequality (52) yields
Condition (16) implies after multiplying by p i (1) and summing over all i
Similarly, (18) implies after multiplying by p i (0) and summing over all i
because x * i (0, v −i ) = 0. Combining the latter two inequalities yields
but this contradicts (54). Hence, under (47) there does not exist a direct mechanism γ = (t, x * ) that satisfies (16)-(22) and, hence, x * is not implementable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider a maximizerγ = (t,x) of problem P.
To show that it satisfies the first statement, note that (22) directly implies that for v i = 0 it holds x i (v i , v −i ) = v i . So it is left to prove x sb 0 (1, v −i ) = 1 ⇒x i (1, v −i ) = 1. Suppose to the contrary that there exists somev ∈ V with somev i = 1 so that x 0 (v) = 1 andx i (1,v −i ) = 0. Then by raising bothx i (1,v −i ) and the correspondinḡ t p i (1,v −i ) by 1, the objective (15) is raised by p(1,v −i )(1−c) > 0, while the constraints (16), (18),(19),(21), and (22) are unaffected, and (17) and (20) are relaxed.
To show the second statement, suppose to the contrary thatγ = (t,x) exhibits
x 0 (v) = 1, while x * 0 (v) = 0 for somev = (v 1 , . . . ,v n ). Define I 1 = {i|x i (v) = 1} as the set of consumers who receive the good underγ and the value realizationv.
Sinceγ is, by assumption, a maximizer of P, it must hold that I 1 is non-empty and, due to (22), for all i ∈ I 1 it holds v i = 1. But since x * 0 (v) = 0, it follows i∈I 1vi (1 − c) ≤ iv i (1 − c) < I. Now consider an alternative mechanismγ = (t,x) that is identical toγ except thatx 0 (v) =x i (v) = 0 and for all i ∈ I 1 it exhibitŝ
First note that a comparison of the objective (15) evaluated atγ andγ yields a difference of p(v)[I − i∈I 1 (1 − c)], which is positive. Hence,γ is not a solution to P ifγ is feasible. In order to see that γ is feasible, we verify that it satisfies (3), (4), (7), (8), and (9) using thatγ satisfies these constraints by assumption.
To verify the first inequality in (3), note it a i (v) = i∈I 1 (t a i (v) − 1 + c) + i ∈I 1t a i (v) ≥ I − i∈I 1 (1 − c) ≥ 0 = Ix 0 (v), where the first inequality follows becauseγ satisfies (3) and the second inequality was already established above.
To verify the second inequality in (3) note i (t a i (v) +t p i (v)) = i∈I 1 (t a i (v) + t p i (v) − 1) + i ∈I 1 (t a i (v) +t p i (v)) ≥ I + c i∈I 1xi (v) − i∈I 1 1 = I − i∈I 1 (1 − c) ≥ 0 = Ix 0 (v) + c ix i (v), where the first inequality follows becauseγ satisfies (3).
Noting that, becauseγ satisfies (4), it trivially follows that alsoγ satisfies (4), we continue to verify (7) and (9). Note that, by construction,
. Becauseγ satisfies (7) and (9), therefore, alsoγ.
Finally, to verify (8) note that forγ we have T a = {I} so that this is also the case forγ. Hence, (8) reduces to (18). To see thatγ satisfies this constraint, note that v∈V n i=1 π(v|I)(t p i (v) − cx i (v)) = v =v n i=1 π(v|I)(t p i (v) − cx i (v)) + i p(v|I)(t p i (v)−cx i (v)) = v =v i π(v|I)(t p i (v)−cx i (v))+ i p(v|I)t p i (v) = v =v i π(v|I)(t p i (v)− cx i (v)) + i ∈I 1 p(v|I)t p i (v) + i∈I 1 p(v|I)t p i (v) = v =v i π(v|I)(t p i (v) − cx i (v)) + n i ∈I 1 p(v|I)t p i (v)+ n i∈I 1 p(v|I)(t p i (v)−c) = v =v i π(v|I)(t p i (v)−cx i (v))+ n i ∈I 1 p(v|I)(t p i (v)− cx i (v)) + n i∈I 1 p(v|I)(t p i (v) − cx i (v)) = v∈V i π(v|I)(t p i (v) − cx i (v)) ≥ αI. To show the proposition's third statement, consider a mechanismγ = (x,t) which satisfies (16)-(22) and there is av such thatx 0 (v) = 0, while iv i > (1 + α)I/(1 − c).
We show thatγ is not a solution to P, because there exists a (x,t) that also satisfies (16)-(22) but yields a strictly higher surplus thatγ. More specifically, let (x,t) be identical to (x,t) except thatx i (v) =v i ,t a i (v) =t a i (v) +v i · I/ jv j , andt p i (v) = t p i (v) +v i (1 − I/ jv j ). Note first that the difference in surplus between (x,t) and (x,t) is p(v)[(1 − c) j v j − I] > 0. It remains to be checked that (x,t) satisfies (16)-(22). That it satisfies (16), (18), (21), and (22) follows directly, because (x,t) satisfies these constraints by assumption and (x,t) is a transformation of (x,t) which preserves them.
Since (19) Finally, to see that (x,t) satisfies (17) because (x,t) does so, first definē
where the first inequality uses that (x,t) satisfies (20), and the final inequality uses the proposition's presumption that iv i > (1 + α)I/(1 − c).
Since (x,t) satisfies (17), the definition of π(v|I) implies that it holds 
which is equivalent to saying that (x,t) satisfies (17).
To show the proposition's last statement, suppose that, to the contrary, there exists a solutionγ = (x,t) of problem P for which such a T does not exist. In this case, there exist a valuation profilev andv with jv j > jv j such that x 0 (v) = 0 andx 0 (v) = 1. Since jv j > jv j , we can find a bijective correspondence k : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} such thatv j = 1 impliesv k(j) = 1. Fix the correspondence k and its inverse k −1 and define the mechanismγ = (x,t) byx 0 (v) =x 0 (v) for
Sinceγ satisfies by assumption all constraints (16)-(22) of problem P, so doesγ. They also yield the same objective (15). But since jv j > jv j , mechanismγ exhibits at least one i such thatv i = 1 and x i (v) = 0. By the first statement of this proposition,γ is not optimal, since there exists a feasibleγ which yields a strictly larger surplus. Consequently, we obtain the contradiction thatγ is not optimal.
